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ABSTRACT: Whether or not capitalism is compatible with ethics is a long stand-
ing dispute. We take up an approach to virtue ethics inspired by Adam Smith and 
consider how market competition influences the virtues most associated with modern 
commercial society. Up to a point, competition nurtures and supports such virtues 
as prudence, temperance, civility, industriousness and honesty. But there are also 
various mechanisms by which competition can have deleterious effects on the 
institutions and incentives necessary for sustaining even these most commercially 
friendly of virtues. It is often supposed that if competitive markets are good, more 
competition must always be better. However, in the long run competition enhanc-
ing policies that neglect the nurturing and support of the bourgeois virtues may 
undermine the continued flourishing of modern commercial society.
KEY WORDS: Adam Smith, competition, virtue ethics, business ethics, bourgeois 
virtues
1. INTRODUCTION
THE RELEVANCE OF VIRTUE ETHICS for understanding business ethics hardly needs justifying in a special issue. Virtue ethics operates at the ground 
level of human individuals’ actions and motivations, analyzed in terms familiar to 
our ordinary intuitions about moral phenomena, which makes it particularly apt 
for the ethical analysis of how people think and act in business contexts (Solomon 
1992a: 318). It thus contrasts with the abstract ‘bird’s eye view’ provided by the 
alternative utilitarian or deontological approaches and the superhuman capacities 
they imply of ethical agents. Virtue ethics also has the peculiar advantage of bringing 
both utilitarian and deontological concerns under consideration under the relevant 
virtues of prudence and justice while not allowing them to singly determine the 
results of ethical analysis (van Staveren 2009: 572). Virtues are character traits 
which go deeper than mere behavior and habits (although these are important for 
their development) but are constitutive of how a person perceives situations and 
reasons for actions. An honest person is understood as honest not because he always 
behaves honestly, e.g., always tells the truth, or because he thinks honesty is the 
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best policy, but because he considers “That would be a lie” as a strong reason not 
to say something (Hursthouse 2007).
The late Robert Solomon made a significant contribution to raising the profile 
of virtue ethics in business ethics (see among other contributions Solomon 1992a, 
1992b, 2002), focusing particularly on Aristotelian virtue ethics and its relevance 
for the corporation perceived as a co-operating community (although he also delved 
more widely into the moral psychology of virtue ethics, including that of Adam 
Smith (Solomon 1998, 2008)). While acknowledging that much business activity is 
indeed rather more co-operative than generally thought, competition is surely also 
an important aspect, and so in contrast this paper considers virtues under competi-
tion. To do so we employ the resources of Adam Smith’s own virtue ethics which he 
developed particularly for the conditions of commercial society (very different from 
Aristotle’s concerns) and laid out in his Theory of Moral Sentiments [TMS] (origi-
nally published in 1759, almost twenty years before The Wealth of Nations [WN]).
Much criticism of capitalism has focused on the supposed self-undermining nature 
of bourgeois ethics—the so-called ‘self-destruction thesis’—in which the processes 
of capitalism themselves destroy the ability of individuals to live a good life and the 
sustainability of capitalism itself.1 Alasdair Mac Intyre, for example, characterizes 
‘external goods,’ such as fame, power or profit as objects of competition, in contrast 
to ‘internal goods,’ which are derived from practices. He argues that much modern 
industrial productive and service work is so organized as to exclude the features 
distinctive to a practice. Thus, “We should expect that, if in a particular society the 
pursuit of external goods were to become dominant, the concept of virtues might 
suffer first attrition and then perhaps something near total effacement. (Mac Intyre 
1981: 196). Yet other authors have argued that market competition in fact disciplines 
people and encourages the development of virtues in various ways.2
We do not directly address such criticisms and defenses of capitalist ethics, which 
are aimed at the level of assessing overall ethical success in a manner impossible 
to treat adequately in a single paper. Instead we address the more specific question 
of what happens to the bourgeois virtues under competition: that is, how do some 
representative bourgeois virtues most closely associated with capitalism—namely 
prudence, temperance, civility, industriousness and honesty—and their underpinning 
moral psychology interact with market forces. Loosely, our thesis is that ‘competi-
tion,’ while compatible with the development of such bourgeois virtues, can also in 
various ways undermine them. (Both critics and apologists of capitalism may here 
be partially correct without contradiction).
Our analysis is inspired and framed by Adam Smith’s virtue ethics, but our ap-
plication of it to this problem also draws from contemporary empirical research. 
Our analysis is deliberately piecemeal and suggestive: we are concerned to identify 
possible mechanisms by which commercial virtues may be strengthened or cor-
rupted in the context of different commercial relationships (such as worker-manager, 
worker-worker, and consumer-business), but we do not attempt the much harder 
task of mapping their interaction into specific outcomes (the really difficult part of 
good social science).3 Thus, despite the wide scope of our subject we are somewhat 
humble in our ambitions and do not seek to produce a comprehensive or systematic 
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picture of virtue ethics for either the broader contemporary commercial society or 
for a more narrowly defined ‘business world.’ Note further that this is intended as 
an internal analysis of the ‘logic of commercial society’ with regard to individual 
ethics, rather than a comparative or historical exercise which would examine the 
development of some contemporary commercial society or compare the ethical 
systems of commercial and non-commercial societies. Nonetheless our analysis 
may be helpful in showing how even those virtues that seem most likely to thrive 
in a commercial society may still be vulnerable to the pressures of commercial life 
and should not be taken for granted.
In the following section we lay out the Smithian virtue ethical system and our 
methodology in more depth. In section 3 we consider how each of these virtues may 
be influenced by the effects of competition, looking first to the beneficial effects of 
competition and then to the possible deleterious effects of more intensive competi-
tion. We conclude with some discussion of the wider implications of our analysis 
and possible lines of future research.
2. ADAM SMITH’S VIRTUE ETHICS FOR A COMMERCIAL SOCIETY
Once having decided to take up a virtue ethics approach to business, there are 
several reasons for favoring Adam Smith’s system in contrast to the more famous 
classical Aristotelian approach. Although Smith was working within the extended 
virtue ethical tradition that began with Plato and Aristotle, and was particularly 
indebted to Aristotle (Hanley 2006, 2009: 86–91),4 his concerns are much more 
familiar to us since he was also an enlightenment philosopher concerned to integrate 
that tradition with liberal individualism (i.e., issues of equality, individual freedom, 
ordinary people and ordinary moral life) (Griswold 1999: 7–21). In contrast, Aris-
totle’s framework and concerns can be difficult to grasp and apply in the modern 
world without either a major effort in translation or drastic simplification. Aristotle’s 
socio-economic world was a very different one from ours.5
Smith considered that a society’s political economy, through its effects on the 
character of its institutions and social interactions, affected the understanding and 
arrangement of the virtues it endorsed.6 Thus the meaning of virtues such as prudence 
and their domain of application shift, while some virtues rise in significance and oth-
ers recede (as was the fate of courage and magnanimity in commercial society). What 
makes Smith’s moral philosophy particularly apt for application to contemporary 
business life is that he himself saw and described the appearance of a commercial 
society characterized by an enormously increased division of labor, dependence on 
strangers, formal property rights, and individual mobility. As Smith put it:
When the division of labour has been once thoroughly established, it is but a very small 
part of a man’s wants which the produce of his own labour can supply. He supplies the 
far greater part of them by exchanging that surplus part of the produce of his own labour, 
which is over and above his own consumption, for such parts of the produce of other men’s 
labour as he has occasion for. Every man thus lives by exchanging, or becomes in some 
measure a merchant, and the society itself grows to be what is properly a commercial 
society. (WN, I.iv.i.37, emphasis added)
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This sociological fact about commercial society—that everyone “becomes in some 
measure a merchant”—is central to Smith’s approach. As he points out, even beg-
gars are embedded in the logic of the market, since they must buy bread with the 
money they are given (WN I.ii.2). Smith took the rise of commercial society, and 
the new sociological and moral relationships that follow, as the entrenched result of 
historical processes that are here to stay and thus a brute fact that moral philosophy 
had to come to grips with. Smith also considered that commercial society brought 
enormous benefits overall that made it worth defending and improving in the di-
rection of his ‘system of natural liberty’ (the argument of WN): namely prosperity 
for ordinary (poor) people, as well as justice, freedom from artificial restrictions 
and from feudal relationships of domination, and increased scope for moral self-
development (cf. Wells forthcoming, §2).
Nevertheless, while unambiguously endorsing commercial society, Smith was 
acutely aware of the possible ethical shortcomings of commercial society and, 
for example, carefully read and responded to Rousseau’s powerful critiques of its 
inequality, inauthenticity and materialism (Rasmussen 2008, Hanley 2008, 2009: 
15–52). Smith considered that commercial society was compatible with ethical 
progress (along with material and political progress), but that progress was not in-
evitable—the pressures of commerce would not automatically create it, and would 
often press against it. The problem Smith set himself in the Theory of Moral Senti-
ments was to explain how ordinary people could lead ethical lives—even excellent 
lives—in the context of a commercial society with its new forms of activities and 
institutions, possibilities and pressures (Hanley 2009: 59), and that is a problem that 
resonates with many of the concerns of contemporary business ethics.
After a long period of relative scholarly neglect, Smith’s Theory of Moral Senti-
ments has rightly come out of the shadow of the more famous Wealth of Nations and 
has been attracting considerable and deep attention from philosophers and historians 
over the last twenty years or so.7 However, within the field of business ethics it is 
Smith’s commitment to social justice and defense of capitalism as a whole that tends 
to be discussed (see, e.g., Bassiry and Jones 1993, and Shepard, Shepard, and Wo-
kutch 1991) while his particular virtue ethics has received relatively little attention.8
Smith’s TMS outlined a comprehensive virtue ethical system he intended to be 
compatible with ordinary people’s understanding of moral life in a commercial 
society and also helpful to ordinary people living and working (as “merchants”) in 
such societies. He therefore addressed himself to two questions, which appear in dif-
ferent forms throughout the book (Griswold 1999: 49–50). The normative question: 
“Wherein does virtue consist? Or what is the tone of temper, and tenor of conduct, 
which constitutes the excellent and praise-worthy character, the character which 
is the natural object of esteem, honor, and approbation?” And the ‘philosopher’s 
question’: “by what power or faculty in the mind is it, that this character, whatever 
it be, is recommended to us? Or in other words, how and by what means does it 
come to pass, that the mind prefers one tenor of conduct to another, denominates 
the one right and the other wrong; considers the one as the object of approbation, 
honor, and reward, and the other of blame, censure, and punishment?” (TMS VII.i.2).
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The first question is concerned with the moral agent’s proper understanding of 
ethics, and Smith’s answer is a virtue ethics based on propriety and adapted to the 
needs of contemporary (commercial) society. However the second question is, Smith 
disingenuously suggests, only of “philosophical curiosity” (TMS VII.iii.3) because 
it concerns the mechanisms (of moral and social psychology, etc) that support and 
maintain a moral system. There is a disjunction between the two questions because 
virtue ethical theory considers that the virtues provide their own self-sufficient moral 
view: the honest person doesn’t lie because, being honest, he finds honesty appeal-
ing and good, and lying unappealing. Therefore close examination of the existence 
of the underlying psychological mechanisms and social institutions ultimately re-
sponsible for such virtues making sense (building habits of honesty from childhood 
with education; rewarding and thus entrenching honest habits with, for example, 
psychological satisfaction, praise, and material opportunities) seems to undermine 
the virtue ethics system itself by revealing the merely proximate nature of one’s 
immediate moral perceptions.9 We won’t go further into the issues this split raises in 
Smith’s moral theorizing (Griswold for one considers this an important incomplete-
ness in Smith’s work (see Griswold 1999, 361–376)), but the split is relevant for our 
argument for we are here concerned with the “philosophical curiosity” of how the 
pressures of commercial society may influence the character and sustainability of 
certain so-called bourgeois virtues through their effects on underlying institutions, 
incentives, and social relationships.10
We employ ‘competition’ to refer to the working out of the logic of the market 
in the “obvious and simple natural system of liberty” envisioned by Smith. Smith 
understood competition as a behavioral activity—as connoted by the verb ‘to com-
pete’—that should be imagined in terms of a race between rivals to sell goods for the 
most possible, to obtain scarce resources, to capture market-share from each other, 
and so on (Blaug 1996: chap. 2).11 From the perspective of producers, “Every man, 
as long as he does not violate the laws of justice, is left perfectly free to pursue his 
own interest his own way, and to bring both his industry and capital into competi-
tion with those of any other man, or order of men” (WN IV.ix.51). While from the 
perspective of consumers, ‘winners’ are judged in terms of the price and quality 
of the goods they offer, rather than such extraneous features as their ethnicity or 
shared kinship. Consumers benefit from competition because prices first decline 
towards the present cost of production and then over the long run decline further 
while quality increases as producers compete with each other for market share and 
higher profits through technological and organizational innovation.12 Here we can 
immediately see the central tension in the idea of competition: the motives of the 
competitors and their interests in the outcome (high profits for themselves) are 
quite different from that of society at large (low prices).13 To make these compatible 
requires particular institutional arrangements, as was Smith’s constant emphasis in 
WN (notwithstanding his powerful critique of allowing economic regulations to be 
written by the competitors themselves).
Thus, like any sporting competition, market competition has to meet certain condi-
tions to be fair and productive of social welfare. Smith’s conditions were relatively 
“obvious and simple”: freedom of entry (no closed guilds, mandatory apprentice-
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ships, restrictions on labor movement, etc); a considerable number of rivals (no de 
facto monopolies); and transparency about market opportunities (Blaug 1996: 42). 
Also like any fair race, there should be a level playing field for the competitors, 
meaning both that the rules of the game are not biased in favor of certain actors (no 
economic micro-management by government), and that the rules of the game are 
fairly enforced to prevent or at least reduce cheating by competitors. The intensity 
of competition reflects both the degree to which markets meet these conditions and 
the degree of rivalry they exhibit.
So much for what competition means and what it requires. In this paper we are 
principally concerned with how such a system of free and fair economic competition 
mediated by markets may affect the flourishing of specific bourgeois virtues. Com-
petition may affect individuals’ virtues in three distinct ways: via habit formation, 
selection, and standard shifting. First, virtues arise as a result of habit formation: 
they are ‘learned,’ and become internalized, through the regular repetition of cer-
tain (good) actions and thinking, often originally motivated by extrinsic motives. 
If competition requires new social arrangements that re-order social interactions 
so that different behaviors are encouraged and rewarded it is reasonable to expect 
individuals (especially newcomers) to develop different behavioral habits that then 
slowly crowd-in into inner attitudes. Second, the frequency of particular virtues or 
virtue ‘phenotypes’ found in a population will be related to their fitness with the 
requirements of a flourishing life in a particular society. That is, virtues against 
which there is a strong selection effect (and those who hold them) may eventually 
be excluded or marginalised. Third, individuals learn how to think about ethical 
problems and qualities by looking at the standards and examples that society holds 
up as successful. Because of the other two effects, competition may produce dif-
ferent norms of propriety and different role-models to model oneself after. These 
mechanisms will overlap in concrete cases and we will not always refer to them 
explicitly in the analysis that follows.
For example in the case of honesty considered at the general level, a firm whose 
managers are burdened by ethical scruples about misleading customers or cheating 
suppliers is presumably at a competitive disadvantage in the marketplace compared 
with a rival not laboring under such a burden, if there is no institutional mechanism 
for recognizing and rewarding honesty (Maitland 1997). Competitors highly moti-
vated to win against a strong field will only follow the rules that pay: it is the most 
efficient company that wins the sales, and to the extent that honesty raises costs 
without being recognized as valuable in itself, it will be driven out of the market 
(selection). To the extent that competition produces new standards of practice, new 
standards of what counts as honesty may propagate (habit formation), for example, 
about how one should respect implicit promises to business partners or what counts 
as honesty in advertising. This means that actors who explicitly consider what 
honesty means will begin from different benchmarks and role-models than their 
predecessors (standard shifting).
We appreciate that this perspective may be disconcerting for some virtue ethicists 
since it suggests that honest practices are ultimately based only on a pragmatic 
‘honesty is the best policy’ rule rather than a true, self reason providing, virtue of 
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honesty. At the risk of repeating ourselves, we are concerned with the ultimate causes 
for virtues but do not mean to displace the first person virtue ethical perspective. 
At the level of ethical decision making, the virtues, to be virtues, must already be 
formed and provide their own understanding of a situation and reasons for action. 
Nonetheless, as our analysis focuses on, the development and nurturing of the virtues 
does require institutional support and clearly if a virtue such as honesty is subject to 
great competitive pressure those institutions will be undermined in the long term, 
while in the short term the most honest actors may be removed or sidelined by the 
selective pressure of the market.
The bourgeois virtues of prudence, temperance, civility, industriousness and 
honesty we consider here were chosen because the ‘Doux Commerce’ literature 
(identified by Albert Hirschman with the likes of Adam Smith, David Hume and 
Montesquieu) endorsed them as being not only compatible with but encouraged by 
the demands of commercial society.14 Of course Smith’s entire system was adapted 
to the needs of commercial society as he understood them. His concept of justice, 
for example, is primarily commutative rather than distributive—concerned with 
fair rules, fair play, the sanctity of individual freedom and property and limited to 
what legal sanctions can achieve—because of his beliefs about what the institu-
tions of commercial society needed and could sustain, as well as the theoretical 
requirements of his harmonious ethical system.15 Smith also acknowledged, and 
worried, that some classical virtues, such as courage, would be much diminished 
in commercial society, but argued that the gains of living in a commercial society 
were still on balance better.16 The bourgeois virtues are thus only a subset of the 
virtues that make up Smith’s whole harmonious virtue ethical system, and certainly 
do not themselves suffice for a whole ethical life. Therefore, although the lack or 
corruption of any of these should be cause for concern (as the lack of courage was 
for Smith), one must be cautious in drawing conclusions about the consequences for 
ethical flourishing in commercial society in general on the basis of how competition 
affects one or all of them.
Due to its concern with particular contexts and everyday moral phenomenology, 
and its use of illustrative stories and exemplars to explain itself—see, for example, 
Smith’s extensive use of literature and drama in TMS—virtue ethics cannot provide 
precise definitions of virtues and the distinctions between them, in contrast to the 
apparent precision of utilitarian and deontological ethics. In everyday moral life, 
moreover, virtues are often mixed together such as prudence-and-industriousness or 
civility-and-honesty, and it can always be debated whether the mixture constitutes 
a new particular virtue or whether its components can be further broken down. It 
is indeed one of the main reasons for the long obscurity of virtue ethics that it does 
not fit the requirements of moral system building which have been so important to 
post-enlightenment moral philosophy. Nevertheless at the pragmatic level it is fairly 
clear what one is talking about when one speaks, for example, of temperance as the 
disposition to restrain and moderate one’s impulsive and inappropriate appetites. 
The other virtues are as follows. Prudence is the virtue of practical wisdom, of cal-
culating efficient means to secure one’s more important commitments and interests; 
civility is the disposition to tolerate others, make oneself tolerable to others, and 
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attend carefully to the needs of others; industriousness concerns the honoring of 
work; and honesty, as discussed, concerns sincerity, truthfulness and fairness.
3. APPLICATION: THE BOURGEOIS VIRTUES IN COMPETITION
3a. Prudence
The qualities most useful to ourselves are, first of all, superior reason and understanding, 
by which we are capable of discerning the remote consequences of all our actions, and of 
foreseeing the advantage or detriment which is likely to result from them: and secondly, 
self-command, by which we are enabled to abstain from present pleasure or to endure 
present pain, in order to obtain a greater pleasure or to avoid a greater pain in some future 
time. In the union of those two qualities consists the virtue of prudence, of all the virtues 
that which is most useful to the individual. (TMS IV.2.6)
The virtue of prudence is concerned with the command of one’s self interest: its 
proper understanding, discipline, and security. Smith was perhaps the last phi-
losopher to consider prudence a proper virtue, rather than mere cleverness at best 
(Griswold 1999, 204). Doing so allowed him to distinguish the morally praiseworthy 
disposition to further one’s self-interest as properly understood, from the vice of 
selfishness. That proper understanding requires taking a metaphorical step back 
from one’s immediate circumstances and concerns to adopt a critical perspective on 
one’s options and interests. The prudent person has a proper concern for her health, 
fortune, reputation and happiness and is cautious not to expose these to unneces-
sary hazard. She studies situations seriously and carefully to understand the remote 
consequences of all her actions.
Smith’s virtue of prudence is required in all sorts of situations, from fixing a bi-
cycle, to forecasting oil prices, to deciding what career to follow. While it is related 
to the economist’s concept of rationality it should not be mistaken for it.17 In contrast 
to economic rationality, ‘self-interest’ is not limited to one’s own welfare; its opera-
tion is not restricted to rigorous maximization; it is compatible with human rather 
than superhuman cognitive powers; and its concern is not only with the judging of 
appropriate means to one’s intermediate aims—such as how to get a good deal on 
oil futures—but also how to choose one’s intermediate aims with respect to one’s 
fundamental concerns. This last requires a degree of critical self-reflection about the 
kind of person one wants to be and the kind of life one wants to lead that is absent 
from contemporary economics. Prudence is the key virtue of commercial society, 
as justice arguably was for Aristotle and benevolence for Christian ethics (McClo-
skey 2006), which is why we consider it at some length. But that doesn’t mean that 
prudence is Smith’s highest virtue or that it should be considered sufficient unto 
itself (as independent and all-encompassing).18 In what follows we first discuss how 
competition may positively affect prudence and then move on to negative effects.
Virtues become dispositions through habitual exercise in supporting environments, 
and competitive markets in which individuals compete ‘as merchants’ for attention 
and profit would certainly seem the kind of environment in which prudence should 
thrive. Competitive markets school individuals in prudence by disciplining their 
327Adam Smith’s Bourgeois Virtues in Competition
foolishness and directing their attention to proper objects. In markets individuals 
are responsible for managing themselves and their resources over time, while the 
transparency and fairness of market prices provides clear and reliable feedback about 
what works, and the costs of mistakes. Individuals thus learn to judge situations 
with care, and to be realistic about their talents and the feasibility of their goals and 
plans. The voluntary nature of market transactions directs individuals to evaluate 
the worth of their activities and products from the perspective of their customers 
and business partners. They will compare their practices with their competitors’ and 
consider what they might improve about themselves. Through commerce, and even 
just going about general life in a commercial society, one thus learns the basics of 
prudence—of objective judgment in practical cases, and of checking the partiality 
of self-love by considering oneself from the perspective of others—which Smith 
considered individuals able to build on in the direction of real wisdom and virtue.19
Prudence may fail because of flaws in one’s reasoning, or when one ceases to 
have a realistic grasp of one’s merits and capacities (false beliefs), or a lack of self-
command (which will be discussed under temperance). As the following examples 
illustrate, these problems may be exacerbated by intense competition in various 
ways. We begin with the effects on consumers of the competition for their attention.
In competitive markets participants not only compete on price, which is relatively 
easy for customers to assess, but by offering different kinds of products (not only 
cheaper computers, but also iPads), and thus an abundance of complex choices 
between high-quality options that may overwhelm and thus reduce prudent delib-
eration (see, e.g., Shafir and Tversky 1992; Shafir, Simonson, and Tversky 1992; 
Dhar 1997). For example, in their research on choice overload, Iyengar and Lepper 
(2000) find that humans, as opposed to ideal economic agents, perform better in a 
limited-choice context than in an abundant-choice context, in the sense that they are 
more satisfied with the choices they make. They find that, relative to limited-choice 
situations, when confronted with large numbers of even trivial choices, people are 
more likely not to make any choice; are more likely to experience the choosing ac-
tivity itself as difficult and frustrating; and are more likely to report dissatisfaction 
and regret about the choices they do make. There is also a great deal of research by 
psychologists and behavioral economists about how framing and affective dimen-
sions can influence evaluation. For example, Carmon, Wertenbroch, and Zeelenberg 
(2003) identify and investigate the phenomenon of option attachment, in which 
choosers develop a sense of pre-factual possession of their choice options during 
the deliberation process when evaluation includes imagining the different possible 
consumption experiences. When consumers eventually make their choice, they ex-
perience a feeling of loss for the paths not taken that is stronger the more, and the 
more attractive, the other options were. This feeling of loss seems to be translated by 
the chooser into a post hoc enhanced evaluation of those forgone choices, making 
it seem that she had made the wrong (imprudent) choice after all.
In the context of abundant and constantly changing alternatives, it is more difficult 
to choose prudently because it becomes harder to work out which choice should 
follow from your self-interest, particularly for those with long-term implications 
(such as the choice of career). Such complex choices are characterized by difficult 
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trade-offs and higher psychological costs in the form of mental stress (Schwartz 2004; 
Mick, Broniarczyk, and Haidt 2004). The emotional cost of making trade-offs does 
more than just diminish our sense of satisfaction with a decision. As the research 
just cited shows, the heavier psychological demands also reduce the quality of deci-
sions by narrowing and confusing the chooser’s focus so that she is no longer able 
to take up a critical perspective and stand apart from her immediate circumstances 
as prudence requires, with additional consequences for self-command.
What does this tendency to make imprudent (bad) choices mean for the virtue of 
prudence? Obviously people will not stop making choices in the modern world just 
because there are too many options to properly assess. People will develop coping 
mechanisms and satisficing heuristics and continue to get along. They will learn to 
restrict the scope of their analysis and discipline their imagination not to dwell on 
the consequences of their choices. As Barry Schwartz suggests, these pressures may 
produce a much shallower kind of chooser, a “picker” who can only “grab this or 
that and hope for the best” from the stream of choices rushing by, constitutionally 
unable to consider their short and long term consequences, to challenge the range of 
options on offer, or to exercise judgment about the significance of different choices 
for her own life (Schwartz 2004: 75).
Our second and third examples concern the problem of actors’ excessive identi-
fication with the perspective of other market participants. In the following we focus 
on the simplistic and partial evaluations to which competitive markets are prone and 
their consequences for agents that internalize this perspective by considering how 
stock market valuations of companies’ activities influence the prudence of managers.
Although the evidence is contended, several empirical studies suggest that compe-
tition in the stock market induces a short-termist orientation in company managers 
because of impatient capital seeking immediate high returns (e.g., Laverty 1996; 
Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal 2005; Rappaport 2005).20 The argument goes that 
since any company’s stocks are easily substituted for others, managers feel a strong 
pressure to satisfy shareholder expectations, even if they seem unreasonable. Of 
course the prudent time horizon to take is the one that is right for that case, and it 
may be that adopting a short-term rather than long-term perspective is often the 
objectively prudent choice to make. In order for this to be imprudence, it must be 
that the judgment of managers or investors is being distorted. If, for example, the 
choice of time-horizons is in fact short-circuited by external pressures or arbitrary 
criteria associated with competition, it can hardly be considered anymore an exercise 
in prudence by the actors concerned.
The financial economist Arnaud Boot (2009) argues that financial actors over-
emphasize the significance of a narrow range of external data about companies 
to which modern financial markets provide relatively easy access—especially 
frequently updating share prices, but also quarterly reports, announcements, and 
external ratings—and that this has facilitated the dominance of a particular evalu-
ational perspective of a company as a kind of black box which is in turn dominated 
by short-term assessment criteria (reflecting the kind of performance data available). 
This evaluational frame becomes yet more dominant the more other financial actors 
employ it, because of ‘performativity effects’ wherein the evaluations of a substantial 
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number of actors influence share prices and thus further enhance the credibility and 
significance of their evaluational perspective (cf. MacKenzie 2006). On the other 
side, Boot argues, managers themselves often internalize this increasingly influential 
financial markets view of the firm, focusing on achieving short-term share price 
movements relative to other companies as the measure of the absolute success of 
their management (independently of any direct personal pecuniary rewards they 
might thereby accrue). If company managers were only responding to pressure from 
actors in financial markets in proportion to their importance in funding the firm, 
then we might suppose they were merely being prudent. However, Boot points out, 
companies in fact typically depend far more on internally generated capital and 
bank loans than they actually do on financial markets for capital.
The problem for prudence is that company directors seem to be transferring their 
own responsibility to judge their company’s capacities and intermediate goals to 
‘the market.’ But this is to mistake the market’s role and capacity for prudence.21 
Market valuations of what one is doing are a useful ‘reality check,’ particularly 
against the self-serving partiality to which individuals are prone when evaluating 
themselves. But they are not reality. They should certainly be incorporated into one’s 
own prudent evaluation, but only together with the additional information internal to 
the company that the market doesn’t see. When such attitudes become normalized 
through competition (selecting out non-conformers; changing behavioral patterns 
through performativity effects; shifting standards about what prudence means), 
Smithian prudence may be greatly diminished. Prudence may be redefined in terms 
of following the judgment of the market at all times, and focusing one’s efforts on 
the tactical management of the relevant short-term indicators (despite the implicit 
contradiction). Indeed, the disposition to orient oneself so entirely to gaining the 
immediate approval of external (and only partially sighted and mildly interested) 
observers is normally termed vanity (a vice), rather than prudence.
Our final example concerns how competitive success can itself distort prudence 
in the direction of arrogance or recklessness, particularly in cases where the differ-
ence in rewards for ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ is very significant.
It is uncontroversial to note that individuals who acquire an overinflated view of 
their merits and capacities are no longer able to objectively analyze the value and 
feasibility of their goals and plans and may become arrogant or reckless instead of 
prudent. One way that competitive markets are schools for prudence is the hum-
bling character of both their process and outcome. They require people to submit, 
under equal terms, to the critical assessment of others whom they may consider 
their inferiors, and they result in what is often a sharply humbling reality check (cf. 
McCloskey 2006, Bovenberg 2007). The prospect is so uncomfortable that Smith 
notes that people have a natural tendency to try to shield themselves from it if they 
can (as aristocrats and slave-owners managed to do). Humility is a constitutive ele-
ment of Smithian prudence. Only by carefully—humbly—listening to the wishes 
of one’s clients can one know what will sell, only by considering the interests and 
capacities of one’s employees, management structure, suppliers, competitors, etc 
can one plan successful business strategies to meet that demand.
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But overly successful market players may stop paying proper attention to the 
market and consider themselves the best judge of their capacities and plans, thus 
converting humility into arrogance. In markets as in sporting tournaments ‘win-
ners’ receive a great deal of praise. Just as the more competitive the tournament, 
the greater the achievement in coming out ahead and the more praise one receives, 
so the more competitive the market and the more it takes a winner-takes-all format, 
the more praise is received by the ‘winners.’ A company’s success, rather like a 
football team’s success, always depends upon a host of situational factors largely 
outside even a CEO’s direct control, including consumers’ interests, competitors’ 
strategies and performance, and the industriousness and co-ordination of the com-
pany’s many employees. Continued success requires acute situational awareness and 
realistic humbleness about one’s own significance. This is difficult enough at the 
best of times—social psychologists have extensively mapped the human propensity 
to overestimate the role of personal dispositions and underestimate the influence of 
situational factors in explaining outcomes, the so-called ‘Fundamental Attribution 
Error.’22 However, excessive praise can reinforce this bias by reinforcing one’s own 
self-confidence about one’s judgment. When one receives praise from one’s depen-
dents one will always have some awareness of its lack of objectivity, but praise that 
follows competitive success is particularly convincing exactly because it appears 
objectively justified. It may be that attending carefully to others’ opinions and trying 
to view oneself as they do, as encouraged by competition, can sometimes further 
reinforce one’s belief in the significance of one’s own role, to the neglect of one’s 
insider knowledge of relevant situational factors. As Smith put it,
The religion and manners of modern times give our great men little encouragement to 
fancy themselves either Gods or even Prophets. Success, however, joined to great popular 
favour, has often so far turned the heads of the greatest of them, as to make them ascribe 
to themselves both an importance and an ability much beyond what they really possessed; 
and, by this presumption, to precipitate themselves into many rash and sometimes ruinous 
adventures. (TMS VI.iii.28)
We are all familiar with stories of CEOs of very real abilities so lionized by the 
markets and the press for their earlier achievements that they came to believe that 
praise too much, and embarked on disastrous strategies that in hindsight seemed to 
follow more from hubristic grandiosity than the pragmatic grasp of business reali-
ties and their own capacities.
Counter-intuitively competitive success itself can thus distort or short-circuit that 
aspect of prudence which requires continual critical reflection on one’s own capaci-
ties. The corollary of this is that it can also short-circuit due diligence on the part 
of other market actors (from analysts to investors to employees) who are carried 
along by such people’s evident self-confidence and reputation. In highly competitive 
markets the rewards of success are often great and the rewards of almost-success 
few. The mismatch between reward and personal capacities can all too easily be 
internalized in the wrong way, in that successful people re-evaluate their talents 
as commensurate with their reward, and lose the capacity or taste for considering 
themselves more objectively.
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3b. Temperance
The love of ease, of pleasure, of applause, and other selfish gratifications, it is always easy 
to restrain for a single moment, or even for a short period of time; but, by their continual 
solicitations, they often mislead us into many weaknesses which we have afterwards 
much reason to be ashamed of. (TMS VI.iii.2)
The virtue of temperance concerns the mastery of these insidious temptations, 
with managing them within the bounds of “health and fortune,” and also within 
the bounds of “grace,” “propriety,” “delicacy,” and “modesty” (TMS I.ii.6). Smith 
considered that temperance could flourish in a society of ‘natural liberty’ for several 
reasons. First, individuals are responsible for managing their own lives and their 
own consumption and are thus able to be develop the virtue of temperance. Second, 
spectators in such a society scrutinize what actors are doing, rather than who they 
are. Third, individuals have a particular interest in developing a general reputation 
for moral decency: to appear credible future transaction partners. In combination, 
these would produce a greater than ever interest on the part of everyone to restrain 
themselves to the standards of public decency.23 Smith considered that the ‘social 
market’ for temperance would tend to encourage frugality, since spectators are more 
likely to disapprove of any small impropriety (in spending more than one has, or 
eating voraciously in public) than excessive propriety. The point is nicely illustrated 
by Benjamin Franklin’s tongue-in-cheek Advice to a Young Tradesman (which Max 
Weber took so seriously in his Spirit of Capitalism):
The most trifling actions that affect a man’s credit are to be regarded. The sound of your 
hammer at five in the morning or nine at night heard by a creditor makes him easy six 
months longer, but if he sees you at a billiard-table or hears your voice at a tavern, when 
you should be at work, he sends for his money the next day. (Franklin 2008: 45)
Nevertheless, temperance has always posed a difficulty for commercial society 
since it seems exactly within a commercial society that vanity may feed off itself 
and generate an ethic of competitive consumerism rather than frugality (as analyzed 
most famously by Rousseau in his Discourse on Inequality). Indeed the opportuni-
ties for consumption, and thus the scope of temperance, are much increased in a 
free market society. Monopolies and sumptuary laws reduce consumers’ purchas-
ing power or directly restrain them from exercising free choice between products. 
They thus reduce the scope for the individual to develop and exercise temperance 
as a virtue. Competitive markets, however, have low entry barriers to producers 
and consumers and thus provide consumers with abundant choices, and through 
efficiency gains, the ability to choose more of them. Consumers can thus satisfy 
more of their wants, which, as Smith’s oft quoted example suggests, are not just 
for bread, but for such socially normal wants as meat and beer as well (WN I.ii.2). 
People in circumstances of abundance and freedom must regulate themselves, and 
thus we may consider temperance a bourgeois virtue that becomes more important 
as competition increases.
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As with all Smith’s virtues, temperance is based on propriety, and the first stage 
of understanding propriety is to understand the relevant social standards, follow-
ing which one can consider whether those social standards are themselves proper 
(excellence).24 As competition increases, people’s ability to judge what level and 
type of consumption is appropriate for them may be undermined by problems in 
determining what temperance requires and by the social comparative processes by 
which wants become normal.
First, wants in a competitive free market society are inherently unstable (cf. Knight 
1923). Producers under competition have an obvious interest in competing with 
each other not only to meet customers’ existing wants, but to promote additional 
consumption by inducing new wants. New products like air-travel, plastic surgery, 
the internet, etc produce whole new categories of ‘normal’ wants. At the same time, 
the high social and geographical mobility associated with a competitive labor market 
means that individuals’ wants, and budgets, are apt to change significantly over the 
course of their lives.
The combination of these make it harder for any particular agent to consider and 
apply the appropriate standards of temperance to her consumption. In particular, it 
is difficult to tell the difference between an unnecessary want and an appropriate 
need, and how much is enough. Do you ‘need’ to buy the latest smartphone so that 
you can check your email on the move? Should you install an air-conditioning sys-
tem in your home for those six excruciating hot weeks in summer? Do you really 
need a second car? Recall that temperance is particularly challenging because it 
must cope with insidious desires that ‘continually solicit’ us to accede to them. It is 
extremely easy to persuade ourselves that what we want to have is what we ought 
to want to have, which is why we need temperance in the first place. The absence 
of non-subjective standards of consumption to refer to makes it much harder to 
resist such “solicitations.”
Second, even when social standards are available they may be distorted and direct 
the actor’s attention to the wrong things. People take their cues about how to judge 
reasonable levels of consumption from the standards, exemplars, and sensibility 
they see in society generally and their peers in particular.25 One turns to others for 
clues as to what it is proper to want. But in certain circumstances this social mirror 
of consumption can work like a ratchet and rise notch by notch (cf. Schor, 1997). 
The social mirror can become a vanity mirror.
The increased anonymity associated with competitive markets (because of labor 
mobility) reduces people’s familiarity with how other people are living, but that 
doesn’t make the social mirror go away. Instead it may distort what one sees in the 
mirror. In so far as competitive markets increase relative anonymity many forms of 
consumption may be more privatized in that although markets are a public space only 
a small part of one’s life is made visible there. Eating habits or the consumption of 
pornography, for example, are largely invisible. That also means that certain forms 
of consumption—of visible material goods—receive much more social attention 
than others. The cars one’s neighbors drive provide an easily visible and comparable 
standard of normal consumption.
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In more anonymous societies one must pick up information about proper levels 
of consumption from other sources than simple observation of one’s peers. The 
presentation of higher levels of consumption as normal by advertising, and also 
television (Frey, Benesch, and Stutzer 2007), can then be particularly influential and 
have performativity effects: it can produce shifts in what individuals understand as 
proper standards of consumption that become self-fulfilling, including shifts from 
non-market sources of satisfaction such as friendship to higher material aspirations.
In addition, material consumption may itself become an area of competition, with 
status within a group accruing to those who succeed in buying the most expensive 
or the most fashionable objects, and stigma to those who fail to do so. The conse-
quences of anonymity just outlined direct people’s attention to each other’s material 
consumption. When this is combined with a spirit of rivalry, public consumption 
becomes something one can win, rather than something one can do better or worse. 
It thus becomes about positional goods (cf. Hirsch, 1977). Recent empirical research 
has abundantly confirmed the importance of such relative consumption (see, e.g., 
Solnick and Hemenway, 1998; Johansson-Stenman, Carlsson, and Daruvala 2002; 
Alpizar, Carsson, and Johansson-Stenman 2005; Carlsson, Johansson-Stenman, 
and Martinsson 2007). For example, positional considerations appear particularly 
important for visible goods like cars but relatively unimportant for invisible ones, 
like vacation time.
The virtue of temperance is here distorted in the direction of vanity, much as 
Rousseau argued. Smithian temperance thrives to the extent that social standards 
discipline our excessive indulgences and direct our consumption to appropriate 
objects. Because we want to be approved of by others, Smith thought we would 
naturally want to be seen to possess that “delicacy” of taste and “grace” that society 
approves of. But the distorted social mirror produced by partial anonymity together 
with the interpersonal rivalry inspired by competition schools individuals in a dif-
ferent direction: not towards impressing others with their modesty but towards 
impressing them with the greatness of their consumption.
In addition to discerning what propriety requires, temperance concerns disciplining 
oneself to act in accordance with propriety. Self-discipline requires opportunities 
for its exercise in order to develop, but those opportunities may be undermined for 
consumers where they are less regularly confronted by social standards in the form 
of disapproval for excessive or tasteless consumption; i.e., there is little to prevent 
the weak of will from indulging present desires when they really do know better. 
The relative anonymity of life in commercial society means that even consumption 
that does take place in public is, within broad limits, generally of little direct interest 
to others. If Franklin’s young tradesman is seen by his creditor cavorting drunkenly 
until late into the night but neither knows each other, any disapproval the creditor 
might feel will be generalized and will hardly have the same salutary effect.
In more anonymous societies there is far less of a social scaffolding system to 
prop up the habits of temperance (or self-command more broadly), for example, 
by internalizing the shame associated with doing certain activities in public, such 
as drinking to excess, into the personal disposition not to do them in private either. 
Smith himself worried that the anonymity of city life or work in large factories might 
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diminish ordinary people’s ability to hold themselves to moral standards, since they 
would no longer be under the disciplinary gaze of others as they would be in a small 
country village (WN V.i.g.12). When no-one else attends to your conduct, Smith 
thought, it was less likely that you would develop the habits of doing so either.
3c. Civility
In civilized society [man] stands at all times in need of the cooperation and assistance of 
great multitudes, while his whole life is scarce sufficient to gain the friendship of a few 
persons. (WN I.ii.2)
Civility is the headline virtue of the Doux Commerce literature, most strongly as-
sociated with Montesquieu’s claim that commerce produces a gentler, more civilized 
and polished human type (Hirschman 1997: 56–63; Hirschman 1982: 1464–66). 
The argument is that extensive use of the market produces both the possibility of 
and incentives for the development, exercise, and internalization of a disposition 
for civility in people’s interactions.
Competitive markets have many possible buyers/sellers with whom one can 
choose to interact and at what price. The efficiency of this relates to the extent of 
the market, and thus the ability of relative strangers to interact peacefully through 
the mechanism of exchange in the marketplace, where the rhetorical arts of “per-
suasion, communication, and non-coercive speech are essential” (Griswold 1999, 
297). Competitive markets structure relationships in such a way that one can interact 
disinterestedly with others, on the basis of the price and quality of the good in ques-
tion, rather than deeper features of each other’s identity. The butcher doesn’t need 
to know, or care, about her customer’s religious beliefs, only that a certain kind of 
meat is wanted. This structural feature makes indifference, or more positively toler-
ance, possible by excluding all sorts of information as irrelevant to the transaction, 
such as race, gender, religion, class, nationality, and so forth. In the market, actors 
must pay the full costs of their ‘taste for discrimination’ since your competitors will 
take the customers you refuse.
On the other hand, competitive markets also provide a positive incentive to civility. 
Since every merchant interacts with relative strangers who neither know nor care 
who she is, only what she wants and how much she will pay, she cannot depend on 
non-market relationships (such as friendship, kinship, or political authority) to help 
her get what she wants. Markets make for modesty because success in the market 
requires acknowledging your dependence on others. Everyone is equal before the 
market and everyone is equally a stranger. The standards by which one behaves are 
therefore the standards one believes characterize the representative disinterested 
stranger, whom one must strive to impress or else lose their custom. Your friends 
may appreciate your dirty jokes, but in the market you have to think about how the 
disinterested stranger might perceive your language and moderate yourself to a pitch 
they can go along with. After all, they can always take their business elsewhere. You 
must also moderate your voice so that you can listen, because in the market those 
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who listen most carefully to the needs of strangers will be best placed to understand 
and meet them.
Of course, it is generally the seller who has the greatest incentives to behave in this 
way, but in the thoroughly commercial society everyone is both a seller and a buyer 
of one thing or another and thus the habits of civility can spread through society in 
general. Thus, competition disciplines each individual to civility: to tolerate others, 
to be tolerable oneself, and to attend carefully to the needs of others.
However, competition may undermine civility in certain circumstances, such as 
when rivalry is intense or anonymity is extensive. Competitors are rivals, but in a 
relatively stable and structured market that need not undermine the virtue of civil-
ity. However, extensive competition continually undermines the stability of market 
structures—new, unknown, and dangerous competitors may appear at any time from 
any quarter, and this may apply not only to new market players but also within firms, 
to the extent that workers or business units compete against each other within a firm. 
In such ‘cut-throat competition,’ as the metaphor suggests, the adversarial aspect 
of competition can come to dominate: one is more concerned with defeating one’s 
rivals than in charming customers, with grabbing the greatest possible share of what 
is available before it disappears rather than patiently seeking to expand it through 
mutually beneficial trade. Engaging in price-wars to drive rivals out of business or 
‘dirty tricks’ to further your own career at the expense of your colleague-rivals is 
to shift focus from the customer’s needs onto your own. That is a self-destructive 
move in the long run, but one which may seem required if everyone else is doing 
the same. Civility requires a degree of openness, hence dovish gentleness, to strang-
ers on the assumption that they will reciprocate rather than take advantage of one’s 
vulnerability.26 That assumption is threatened by the appearance of large numbers 
of hawks in the population, particularly if they are difficult to identify in advance 
(because of anonymity).
The consequences for the virtue of civility itself are that business ethics may 
take on a more martial aspect associated with toughness and courage rather than 
the courteous attention to the needs of others associated with wooing customers. 
The virtue of civility and its gentle manners may be thus replaced by aggressive 
hostility, conspiracy to exclude newcomers, rudeness, and so forth.
3d. Industriousness
[T]he man of inferior rank . . . must acquire dependants to balance the dependants of the 
great, and he has no other fund to pay them from, but the labour of his body, and the ac-
tivity of his mind. He must cultivate these therefore: he must acquire superior knowledge 
in his profession, and superior industry in the exercise of it. He must be patient in labour, 
resolute in danger, and firm in distress. These talents he must bring into public view, by 
the difficulty, importance, and, at the same time, good judgment of his undertakings, and 
by the severe and unrelenting application with which he pursues them. (TMS I.iii.20)
The virtue of industriousness concerns the honoring of work as a good thing, almost 
a sacred task, that deserves diligence and commitment. This is claimed to have a 
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particular association with commercial society since it is under free competition that 
people get to choose what kind of work to pursue and how much to do: to be their 
own boss. Indeed it can be argued that “the honoring of work apart from manual 
drudgery or heroic daring” is key to the self-identity of the bourgeoisie, the social 
class that both creates and arises out of modern commercial society (McCloskey 
2006: 75).
There is a general agreement that competitive markets foster industry and inven-
tiveness since workers get to keep a share of their enhanced productivity (Maitland 
1997). Competition distinguishes and rewards character traits like diligence, 
punctuality, entrepreneurship, and the intrinsic motivation to work (Kreps 1997). 
There is evidence that being one’s own boss, as promoted by competition, makes 
one work harder than salaried employment (see, e.g., Lazear 2000; Shearer 2004). 
It can also be more satisfying since one is being directly rewarded for doing what 
one is good at. For example, in one experimental study Marion Lienhard (2006) 
found that piece rates not only directly increased performance relative to fixed 
wages by increasing effort, but also had an endogenous effect: piece-rate workers 
raised their productivity in each period (perhaps reflecting an increased incentive 
to learn). While those working under piece rates generally reported feeling more 
restless than those under fixed wages, they also reported feeling more focused on 
their work and ‘having more fun.’
So competition can lead to meritocracy that induces industriousness. Nevertheless, 
industriousness under competition can easily become self-undermining exactly be-
cause competition distorts the rewards of hard work in a particularly seductive way.
First, an underdeveloped but over-exercised virtue of industriousness can crowd 
out the other virtues, leading to people living-to-work, instead of working-to-live.
Adam Smith himself identified one of the most troubling consequences of the 
specialization, allowed by the increased extent of the market, that had increased 
productivity so enormously: pin factory workers could become ‘pinheads,’ “as stupid 
and ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become . . . incapable . . . of 
conceiving any generous, noble, or tender sentiment” (WN V.i.f.50).
In addition, intense competition produces self-perpetuating anxiety and restless-
ness, which undermines the peace of mind required for the exercise of other virtues 
like prudence and temperance.27 The greater the degree of market competition to 
which worker-entrepreneurs are exposed the more they will be judged purely on 
the basis of the market value of what they produce, and the more relentlessly they 
must compete with every other worker in this field and treat every project as cru-
cial for their identity as well as their career. And this may be the case even if their 
financial rewards are fair (market) compensation for the productivity of their labor. 
Managers have an obvious interest in encouraging this in order to get as much 
work as possible out of workers: in increasingly competitive circumstances that 
incentive increases as the labor regulations restricting them decrease (cf. Schor 
1993). People may find themselves working many hours per week at the expense 
of the other important commitments in their lives, such as family relationships and 
long-term health,28 for a financial reward that, if they thought about it, they would 
realize they don’t really need.
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It is quite possible that many people do want to work very long hours for private 
reasons that are completely sensible, even ethically excellent, whether to build up 
a company of their own or to pay for the care needs of a disabled child. The issue 
we are concerned with is whether competition distorts the decision process itself so 
that it becomes very difficult not to choose to work extremely long hours. Not only 
because people must bear the full cost of choosing to work less, or in safer condi-
tions, as a lower earning power relative to those who are willing to work flat-out (a 
matter of prudence). But also and primarily because only a certain kind of success 
is appreciated by the market, and people do want to be successful.
Adam Smith himself gives an example of how the luster of competitive success 
can seduce us into a primitive kind of industriousness quite out of line both with 
true industriousness and with what true prudence about the furthering of one’s 
interests really requires. Smith’s parable of ‘The poor man’s son, whom heaven in 
its anger has visited with ambition’ is itself a rhetorical tour de force and we quote 
it at some length to demonstrate the vehemence of Smith’s skepticism of material 
self-interest. The poor man’s son is enchanted by the picture of the tranquility, com-
fort, and laziness he believes the accoutrements of the rich afford them (their large 
comfortable houses, fancy trinkets, servants, and so on). So he chooses to pursue 
wealth and greatness and
submits in the first year, nay in the first month of his application, to more fatigue of body 
and more uneasiness of mind than he could have suffered through the whole of his life 
from the want of them. He studies to distinguish himself in some laborious profession. 
With the most unrelenting industry he labours night and day to acquire talents superior to 
all his competitors. He endeavours next to bring those talents into public view, and with 
equal assiduity solicits every opportunity of employment. For this purpose he makes his 
court to all mankind; he serves those whom he hates, and is obsequious to those whom 
he despises. Through the whole of his life he pursues the idea of a certain artificial and 
elegant repose which he may never arrive at, for which he sacrifices a real tranquillity 
that is at all times in his power, and which, if in the extremity of old age he should at 
last attain to it, he will find to be in no respect preferable to that humble security and 
contentment which he had abandoned for it. It is then, in the last dregs of life, his body 
wasted with toil and diseases, his mind galled and ruffled by the memory of a thousand 
injuries and disappointments which he imagines he has met with from the injustice of 
his enemies, or from the perfidy and ingratitude of his friends, that he begins at last to 
find that wealth and greatness are mere trinkets of frivolous utility. . . . In this miserable 
aspect does greatness appear to every man when reduced either by spleen or disease to 
observe with attention his own situation, and to consider what it is that is really wanting 
to his happiness. Power and riches appear then to be, what they are, enormous and op-
erose machines contrived to produce a few trifling conveniencies to the body, consisting 
of springs the most nice and delicate, which must be kept in order with the most anxious 
attention, and which in spite of all our care are ready every moment to burst into pieces, 
and to crush in their ruins their unfortunate possessor. They are immense fabrics, which 
it requires the labour of a life to raise, which threaten every moment to overwhelm the 
person that dwells in them, and which while they stand, though they may save him from 
some smaller inconveniencies, can protect him from none of the severer inclemencies of 
the season. They keep off the summer shower, not the winter storm, but leave him always 
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as much, and sometimes more exposed than before, to anxiety, to fear, and to sorrow; to 
diseases, to danger, and to death. (TMS IV.1.8, emphases added)
The poor man’s son possesses enough prudence to effectively achieve his intermedi-
ate goal of wealth, but not enough to consider whether his means, industriousness, 
and his final end, tranquility, are compatible.29 But it is also clear that the poor man’s 
son misses the excellence of industriousness because he does not really honor work. 
Being poor, and wanting to be rich, he has chosen to work very hard at the kind of 
job that the market will reward him for with wealth and greatness, but only in order 
to reach his true aim of being free from work. He never thought to choose work that 
would provide intrinsic rewards and be worthwhile and fulfilling in itself. As a result 
he never stops perceiving work as the unhappy drudgery that must be got through 
in order to satisfy his material desires. In the absence of the true virtue of industri-
ousness, people will only ever work for and according to external incentives—i.e., 
under market competition, for wealth—and not for themselves.
To see how self-motivated industriousness and market-motivated industrious-
ness differ consider its effects within the firm. As Solomon has pointed out, firms 
are co-operative communities (Solomon 1992a). They exist because of the posi-
tive economies of scale to many business activities (not only to reduce negative 
transaction costs), for example, those due to teamwork (Heath 2006). Teams are 
groups whose work characterized by disproportionately increasing returns to each 
additional individual’s contribution. Here it isn’t possible to isolate each individual’s 
particular marginal contribution, and it is even difficult to externally monitor effort. 
Effective teamwork depends on the development of reciprocity and trust between 
members in environments insulated from certain market relationships (Heath 
2006: 331). Introducing market type competition means that workers inside a firm 
will compete directly with each other as if they were independent contractors in a 
market, i.e., willing to work hard, but only for market based competitive pay. This 
may well unravel the delicate reciprocity between team-members by encouraging 
greater strategic performance (e.g., shirking) by members looking to maximize their 
apparent contribution but minimize their actual effort. If effective teamwork is no 
longer possible, it may be necessary to switch to less efficient piece-rate systems 
of production and those positive returns to co-operation would be permanently lost. 
Here increasing competition that induces only a primitive form of industriousness 
leads to reduced diligence and commitment as a result of its own narrow logic.
3e. Honesty
The success of [men in the inferior and middling stations of life] almost always depends 
upon the favour and good opinion of their neighbours and equals; and without a toler-
ably regular conduct these can very seldom be obtained. The good old proverb, therefore, 
that honesty is the best policy, holds, in such situations, almost always perfectly true. In 
such situations, therefore, we may generally expect a considerable degree of virtue; and, 
fortunately for the good morals of society, these are the situations of by far the greater 
part of mankind. (TMS I.iii.32)
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Honesty as a virtue and an excellence is about more than truth-telling (deontologi-
cal duties) or ‘best policies’ (utilitarian calculations). At the heart of honesty is a 
commitment to impartiality, involving appropriate respect for the legitimate interests 
of others and the consideration of what an impartial spectator would consider right 
for someone in your position to say and do.30 Dishonesty consists in a self-serving 
partiality that systematically disrespects one’s interlocutors and relationship partners, 
that disrespects their autonomy by considering them in a purely instrumental way, 
for example, by failing to tell one’s commercial partners information they have a 
right to know. Honesty therefore goes beyond truth-telling or ‘not-lying’ to include 
such general qualities as sincerity and frankness which make trusting cooperation 
possible. But it also concerns the particular orientation and concerns that should 
follow from the roles, relationships and promises that one enters into. One should 
become disposed to automatically consider the legitimate interests of one’s com-
mercial partners—whether they be customers, employees, or collaborators—and 
provide the information and service that they have the right to expect.
In commercial societies where buyers and sellers are free to switch to other part-
ners, establishing a reputation for honesty is certainly the best policy. According to 
Smith, people who seldom deal with others are more disposed to cheat, while the 
repeat transactors found in commercial societies will see that they can profit bet-
ter by offering the best price/quality goods rather than by deceiving others (Smith 
1982a: 538–39). The efficient working of commerce depends on mutually trusting 
relationships to the extent that complete contracting is not possible (which as New 
Institutionalist economists have demonstrated, is a very great deal). Members of 
commercial societies therefore have an interest in honesty: there is a competitive 
advantage to interacting with honest merchants and thus for being seen as honest 
oneself. In the longer run one may expect, as Smith did, that the extrinsic incentives 
provided by markets will be internalized and elaborated into the genuine virtue of 
honesty. Indeed, recent empirical research finds a correlation between the degree 
of market integration and the take-up and enforcement of fairness norms across 
multiple societies, and suggests that such norms are socially developed responses 
to commercial incentives rather than natural evolutionary adaptations (Henrich et 
al. 2010). Other research argues that the formal institutions of property rights and 
contract law associated with increased use of markets increase trust in a society 
(e.g., Knack and Keefer 1997, Berggren and Jordahl 2006).
In the following we first discuss the role of reputation mechanisms in supporting 
the viability of honest and how they are affected by intense competition and then 
move on to discuss how the core feature of impartiality may be undermined by 
certain institutional arrangements, and finally the scope for competitive innovation 
about what honesty means.
Within competitive markets honesty is assessed and rewarded through reputation 
mechanisms which operate wherever three conditions are jointly met (Bovenberg 
2002; Graafland and Smid 2004; Smith 1982a: 538–39). First, information about 
the agent’s past behavior must be available to all potential trading partners. Sec-
ond, as a good reputation only pays off in the future, a good reputation will only 
be important to the company if it has a long-term horizon. Third, the reputation 
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mechanism is more effective if a good reputation is collectively rewarded and a bad 
reputation collectively punished. In moderately competitive markets the reputation 
mechanism tends to work well: collective punishment is self-enforcing and neither 
the government nor the courts have to participate in punishing dishonest behavior 
(Graafland and Smid 2004).
However, honesty can be undermined by the effects of increasing competition 
on reputation mechanisms. Low entry/exit barriers mean that players in the market 
may change constantly so that information quickly becomes outdated and long-term 
horizons collapse. The short term focus induced by competition can corrode trust 
by crowding out people’s long-term commitments (Sennet 1998). Layard (2003) 
argues, based on various sociological studies, that flexibility and geographical mobil-
ity, often defended by economists because they facilitate competitiveness, decrease 
mutual trust and therefore trusting behavior. Furthermore, large numbers of market 
participants (e.g., following the global extension of markets) are also difficult to keep 
track of and may also fail to take up their obligations as community members to take 
the trouble to punish bad behavior. Information about the honesty of counter-parties 
may be difficult to obtain and of low quality since one has a second order problem 
in analyzing the honesty of both dishonesty reporters and information brokers such 
as rating agencies.
To the extent that intense competition may undermine the viability of reputation 
mechanisms, it undermines the disciplinary effect of competition in schooling in-
dividuals to be honest. As was noted earlier, if honesty is not picked out and valued 
by the market, it may be subject to competitive selection to the extent that honest 
actors are less efficient in achieving what the market does measure and value. The 
properly honest competitor will then face a relative or even absolute decline in 
her ability to compete on such a playing field and may eventually have to choose 
between adopting the dominant strategies or going out of business.
Apart from affecting the reputation mechanisms supporting the viability of hon-
esty, competition may also directly corrupt its commitment to impartiality. There are 
some ways of organizing firms, and some products, that may thrive in competitive 
markets but that may present such extensive moral hazard that Smithian honesty 
becomes impossible.
Finance provides many examples of how certain institutional arrangements, 
combined with competition, may crowd out impartiality. Companies with interests 
in both brokerage fees from facilitating transactions and capital gains from propri-
etary trading depend on apparently very fragile ‘Chinese walls’ to maintain proper 
impartiality. Likewise rating agencies paid by those they rate but owing impartiality 
to the wider public. Competition between rating agencies does indeed appear to 
have induced a softening of professional standards (‘rating inflation’), because of 
the clear financial incentives rating agencies have to keep their paying customers 
happy by giving them somewhat higher ratings than objectively warranted (Skreta 
and Veldkamp, 2009).
There are also some product innovations that may involve such moral hazard that 
they put excessive pressure on impartiality, such as some derivative products sold 
in the lead up to the 2008 financial crisis that allowed actors to buy insurance on 
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other companies defaulting on commitments they had encouraged them to make (the 
moral hazard of which has been likened to being allowed to sell people damaged 
second hand cars and then buy accident insurance on them). Such products may be 
directly incompatible with the impartiality one’s market partners deserve, may cer-
tainly put pressure on one to behave partially, and may provide new and influential 
exemplars of acceptable behavior that shift other market agents to understand the 
demands of honesty in the same way (for example to interpret honesty as requiring 
no more than meeting the minimum legal obligations since other market agents are 
‘grownups’ who should know what they’re doing).
There can also be competition for dishonesty. Since honesty concerns discrimi-
nating judgment about one’s imperfect obligations to others it covers a wide grey 
area. There is much scope here for profitable ‘innovation’ or ‘gamesmanship’ about 
the informal standards of what honesty means, even while remaining technically 
within the law. For example, where market structures enable one company to force 
others to accept grossly unfair changes in terms and conditions of payment (such 
as large corporations are often able to demand from their smaller suppliers or from 
non-contracted workers) competition will encourage directors to do so because the 
company is competing with rivals to sell similar goods at the lowest production price. 
Directors of pharmaceutical companies may choose not to publicize problematic 
side-effects that would affect sales, as is presently often their legal right. Advertis-
ers have incentives and plenty of scope to exploit information asymmetries and 
mislead consumers, while avoiding the strict legal proscription of being “materially 
misleading” (Heath 2007: 370).
The keener the competition, the higher the pressure to perform, the more such 
innovations will be taken up by others and the more pervasive they will become as 
part of the basic operating environment for all players, and thus the more normal 
they will appear. Honesty may come to mean something quite different in the market 
from what it means outside, for example, in one’s dealing with one’s colleagues 
within the firm, and this difference will itself come to seem natural and unremarkable.
4. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In the conclusion of his influential article Hirschman suggested that the moral 
foundations of commercial society might be considered in terms of a moral bal-
ance sheet with incomings and outgoings from its moral stock (Hirschman 1982: 
1483). He illustrated his argument with the example that the practice of commercial 
transactions generates feelings of trust and similar ‘doux commerce’ feelings, but 
at the same time permeates all spheres of life with the element of calculation and 
instrumental reason. Hirschman thereby acknowledged that an excess of depletion 
over replenishment was possible, resulting in a crisis of the system.
We have not attempted so comprehensive an analysis but have focused instead 
on the effects of competition on a key subset of bourgeois virtues and attempted 
to show that although they may indeed thrive in moderately competitive circum-
stances that provide a ‘school’ for the virtues, there are many specific mechanisms 
associated with intensive competition that may crowd out these virtues and their 
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underpinning institutions. In general, competitive markets may support and be sup-
ported by such virtues where competition supports emulation, individual autonomy, 
interdependency, reputation building, and meritocracy within shifting but relatively 
stable structures. However, higher degrees of competition may also undermine 
these virtues when individuals are not permitted the relative stability to develop 
and exercise them and where market forces, and resulting social pressures, either 
provide no support for their development or incentives against their development.
The flourishing of virtues and the flourishing of commerce are conceptually distin-
guishable. In the short term, as we have shown, they may point in different directions. 
Nonetheless in the long term the flourishing of the bourgeois virtues—such as the 
honesty that supports trusting, long-term, co-operative relationships—would seem 
to be important for the flourishing of commerce, as many social capital analyses 
have suggested (see, e.g., Zak and Knack 2001). We should also note that while 
competitive pressures may undermine these virtues they will not necessarily replace 
them with different ones. In fact extreme competition would seem to undermine the 
capacities of individuals to maintain long term character dispositions at all in the 
face of relentless flux in conditions and relationships.31 But considering the logical 
extreme is of course too easy. The really important question is about the contested 
middle-ground in which recognizably human agents operate in the circumstances of 
intense but not impossible competition. Smithian analysis here has an advantage over 
orthodox economic theory because human psychology—and frailty—is properly 
at the centre, together with its dependence on various institutional arrangements. 
In light of this, one should be suspicious of the general promotion of competition 
(and the conditions for purer, freer competition):32 though greater competition is 
claimed to increase market efficiency, welfare, and freedom, our analysis suggests 
that relationship should not be taken for granted in all circumstances.
Our analysis suggests lines of future research. First, the Smithian framework that 
our paper develops for analyzing the relationship between competition and virtues 
invites a more detailed analysis of each of the bourgeois virtues that are highlighted 
in this article, as well as the other virtues—such as justice and benevolence—that 
Smith considered important for an ethically successful commercial society. Such 
a micro-level analysis would draw far more systematically on the extensive social 
scientific literature than has been possible in this paper. Such an analysis would also 
allow us to say much more about how specific institutional arrangements associated 
with market competition affect different virtues.
Second, this line of research may have public policy implications that are worth 
investigating. If there is, in crude terms, a trade-off between high competition and 
sustainable commercial society via the relationship between specific competitive 
market institutions and particular virtues, it may be that targeted institutional in-
terventions could shift that trade-off to the right, allowing us to capture more of 
the benefits of competition in a sustainable way (notwithstanding the role of direct 
educational efforts concerned with promoting the understanding of true virtues of 
the kind recommended by Robert Solomon and other business virtue ethicists).33 
Such interventions are in fact routine in successful capitalist countries, but are gen-
erally restricted to dealing with perceived market failures and justified on the basis 
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of justice (such as labor protection) and welfare (such as consumer prices). But 
they are rarely explicitly focused on the problem of individual ethics: how to help 
people live good lives under the particular pressures and temptations of commercial 
society. Although to some extent the standard regulatory concerns may coincide 
with the institutional underpinnings of the bourgeois virtues—for example reducing 
information asymmetries can be justified in terms of consumer welfare as well as 
making dishonesty more difficult—it would be interesting to look more closely at 
what a Smithian virtue ethical approach would recommend.
In brief, our analysis suggests that such interventions would have public goods 
characteristics and would need to come from outside the logic of the market itself, 
although that doesn’t mean that only governments can supply them. For example, 
there may be a big role for business civil society institutions and associations. Such 
interventions should be as far as possible compatible with the proper interests of 
market actors, with government interest more focused on promoting the conditions 
for sustainable ethical flourishing than the legal prescription of particular outcomes.
Examples of such interventions might include introducing stability by putting 
a floor underneath market practices, for example, by banning certain business 
structures and products associated with excessive moral hazard. Legal status for 
professional codes of practice and ethics can also support individuals’ ability to 
withstand pressures towards the lowest common denominator, reduce gamesman-
ship, and provide clear moral exemplars for new market entrants. More responsible 
framing of choices may make it easier for individuals to exercise prudence and tem-
perance.34 Higher standards of transparency, together with reporting requirements, 
can support reputation mechanisms by supporting the re-identifiability of agents, 
the free flow of accurate information and compulsory reporting of dishonesty.
NOTES
1. Notable contemporary proponents of this critique include Alasdair Mac Intyre (see, e.g., Mac Intyre 
1981, 1995) and Richard Sennett (see, e.g., Sennett 1998, 2007).
2. Contemporary examples include Maitland 1997; Florida 2002; McCloskey 2006; Badhwar 2008.
3. There are severe methodological problems in translating social science research on relevant topics 
like social capital and rationality into meaningful evidence about virtues.
Firstly, how should one understand the terminology of empirical research in terms of virtue ethics? Many 
normative terms in empirical research such as ‘trust’ or ‘fairness’ have specific and concrete definitions, 
often based on behaviorist criteria, that aid standardized measurement and experimental design within a 
particular field of sub-field but do not have the generality of virtue ethical terms like honesty. ‘Social capital’ 
is not civility, but it seems related; likewise ‘rationality’ is not prudence; ‘inequity aversion’ is not honesty 
(or even fairness), ‘job intensity’ is not industriousness, and so on.
Secondly, is a mechanism identified by such research significant in the real world: i.e., is it at work 
outside the laboratory context? How does it interact with other mechanisms to produce outcomes? Virtue 
ethics is about enduring character dispositions, but most empirical research concerns observable behavioral 
patterns and often has a limited temporal horizon and narrow focus (especially experiments). Thus although 
we assume that changes in behavior induced by competition can generate enduring changes to character, 
and hence virtues, the empirical research that we refer to provides at best some indirect suggestions for this.
These methodological considerations necessitated the piecemeal and pragmatic use we make of empiri-
cal research to support the plausibility of the tendencies we suggest, rather than to demonstrate them or 
particular outcomes.
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4. Indeed McCloskey considers Adam Smith to be “the Last of the Former Virtue Ethicists” (McCloskey 
2008).
5. For further analyses of the differences between Aristotle’s and Smith’s virtue ethics see, for example, 
Calkins and Werhane 1998; McCloskey 2006.
6. On Smith’s stadial view of societal development and its relation to moral systems see, for example, 
Pitts 2005 (chap. 2). Political economy sets the broad structural features of a society but does not determine 
its ethics with any precision.
7. Including, for example, Griswold 1999; Otteson 2002; Fleischacker 2005; Rasmussen 2008; Hanley 
2009.
8. Although there has been some. Patricia Werhane, for example, has published on the relevance of a 
properly understood virtue-ethical Smith for business ethics (particularly focussing on justice) (Werhane 
2000). Elsewhere she has also made innovative use of Smith’s moral psychology in her work on moral 
imagination in business (Werhane 1999).
9. Smith in fact conducts a running battle in TMS with those, such as Mandeville and the stoics, whom 
he accused of eliding the first order subjective perceptions of ordinary moral actors with the ultimate causes 
of morality in a manner which caused the former to disappear (Griswold 1999, 53–4).
10. The role of social institutions is an important, if understudied, issue in virtue ethics. Solomon, for 
example, often quoted the Greek saying to the effect that “to live the good life one must live in a great city” 
(e.g., Solomon 1992a, 327). Although in that case Solomon was relating the issue to his advice to his stu-
dents to choose a good community (corporation) to work for, while we are concerned with the wider social 
context of commercial society in general, which individuals do not really have a choice over.
11. As Blaug notes, such a process orientated conception of competition is fundamentally distinct from 
the end-state conception, common in contemporary mainstream economics, which is focused on allocative 
efficiency under circumstances of ‘perfect competition.’ Nevertheless ‘competition as rivalry’ is still employed 
in contemporary economics. For example, Vickers (1995) adopts ‘rivalry’ as the core of his definition of 
competition (following Stigler’s (1987) definition in the New Palgrave). Vickers notes that his definition is 
broad in the sense that it encompasses all sorts of forms of rivalry; that it defines competition in behavioral 
terms (rather than in terms of states or situation); that it does not in any way presume that more competition 
is necessarily good; and that it is closely linked to Adam Smith’s concept of competition.
12. Cf. Smith: producers “in order to undersell one another, have recourse to new divisions of labour and 
new improvements of art which might never otherwise have been thought of.” (WN V.i.e.26). This shows 
that Smith’s understanding of the dynamics of competition goes beyond immediate price determination 
within markets, to include aspects of what is now called ‘Schumpeterian competition.’
13. Cf. Smith: “The interest of the dealers, however, in any particular branch of trade or manufactures, 
is always in some respects different from, and even opposite to, that of the public. To widen the market 
and to narrow the competition, is always the interest of the dealers. To widen the market may frequently be 
agreeable enough to the interest of the public; but to narrow the competition must always be against it, and 
can serve only to enable the dealers, by raising their profits above what they naturally would be, to levy, for 
their own benefit, an absurd tax upon the rest of their fellow-citizens.” (WN I.xi.p.10)
14. We derive our list from those emphasized by Hirschman (Hirschman 1982: 1465), though we leave 
out ‘punctuality.’ We do not claim that our list is definitive.
15. Werhane considers justice to be the essential virtue for Smith’s political economy since it is the 
foundation of the functioning commercial society (Werhane 1989; 1991). It certainly is important to Smith. 
Nevertheless we do not include justice on our list of bourgeois virtues because it is not generally included to 
the Doux Commerce thesis (e.g., in Hirschman’s list [Hirschman 1982]), and indeed is generally considered 
necessary to any political community ‘commercial’ or otherwise. In addition, Smith’s particularly narrow 
interpretation of justice as commutative only, as one’s perfectly specifiable, and thus legally enforceable, 
obligations to others, makes it an unusual virtue in which excellence is impossible. In Smith’s words, “Mere 
justice is, upon most occasions, but a negative virtue, and only hinders us from hurting our neighbour. The 
man who barely abstains from violating either the person, or the estate, or the reputation of his neighbours, 
has surely very little positive merit. He fulfils, however, all the rules of what is peculiarly called justice, and 
does every thing which his equals can with propriety force him to do, or which they can punish him for not 
doing. We may often fulfil all the rules of justice by sitting still and doing nothing.” (TMS II.ii.9)
16. Smith: “Another bad effect of commerce is that it sinks the courage of mankind and tends to extinguish 
martial spirit” (Smith 1982a: 540), because the division of labour reduces the physical and mental capaci-
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ties of the poor while the pursuit of art and luxury by the rich makes them “effeminate and dastardly.” The 
workings of commercial society made this more or less inevitable, but here as elsewhere Smith proposed 
that institutional responses, organised by government, could partially redress the decline of martial spirit 
and its consequences (WN V.f.58–60).
17. McCloskey characterizes prudence as the essential ‘executive function’ in ethical life and describes 
the economist’s version of it as a caricature that both reduces all other virtues, such as love and justice, to 
elements of a utility function, and reduces practical wisdom itself to the self-serving opportunistic calcula-
tion of utility maximization (see, e.g., McCloskey 1998).
18. Smith notes that self-directed prudence “commands a certain cold esteem, but seems not entitled to 
any very ardent love or admiration” (TMS VI.i.14). Hanley makes a good case for considering beneficience 
the highest virtue in Smith’s system (Hanley 2009); Werhane argues that it is justice (Werhane 1991); while 
Raphael & Macfie take the stoical interpretation that it is self-command (Raphael and Macfie 1982).
19. Smith argues that the ordinary form of each virtue found in contemporary social practices, which 
no-one has an excuse not to achieve, contains within its logic an idea of excellence, of true virtue: “The wise 
and virtuous man directs his principal attention to the first standard; the idea of exact propriety and perfec-
tion. There exists in the mind of every man, an idea of this kind, gradually formed from his observations 
upon the character and conduct both of himself and of other people. It is the slow, gradual, and progressive 
work of the great demigod within the breast, the great judge and arbiter of conduct. . . . Every day some 
feature is improved; every day some blemish is corrected” (TMS VI.iii.25). Considering one’s talents from 
the perspective of market demand is not to recognize their ‘true worth,’ but it can be a helpful start.
20. For example, Rappaport notes that while the average holding period for stocks until the mid-1960s 
was about seven years, it is now less than a year in professionally managed funds (Rappaport 2005).
21. Smith believed that markets could school people in prudence, but not that markets could substitute 
for individual prudence, and he would have had no truck with the Efficient Market Hypothesis. Thus, de-
spite his commitments to free competition, Smith in fact proposed various regulations to prevent markets 
from being overcome by imprudence, such as banking regulations and interest rate limits (WN II.ii.94, WN 
II.iv.15).
22. The term was coined by the social psychologist Lee Ross (Ross 1977) to cover a range of related 
phenomena, including the tendency of agents to attribute their own successes to their own qualities and 
their failures to external forces. Other research suggests that the effect is positively related to the level of 
individualism in a society (e.g., Miller 1984), which would itself seem a natural consequence of increased 
competition. It has been taken up in the behavioural economics literature (e.g., Kahneman, Slovic, and 
Tversky 1982: 135–140), who speculate that to an observer agents generally appear more salient than situ-
ational features (139).
23. As Smith notes, “The great secret of education is to direct vanity to proper objects” (TMS VI.iii.46).
24. Smith presents a complex account of human moral psychology in TMS to support this. Humans 
naturally desire the approval of others and so learn to consider their behaviour from the perspective of any 
representative distinterested bystander, or impartial spectator, and adapt their behavior to meet its approval 
even if no one is present. The impartial spectator then provides a device for the individual to develop their 
own sense of propriety that may go beyond actual social conventions. For example, Smith turned European 
criticism of ‘barbaric’ Chinese foot-binding practices around and showed that the logic of the argument, to 
an impartial spectator, was equally applicable to the physically disfiguring corsets that European fashion 
had imposed on women (TMS TMS V.1.8).
25. Even most ‘necessities’ are not physiologically based, but set by society’s minimal requirements 
of decency, which does not make them any less real. As Smith noted, in different parts of Europe people 
needed different clothes just to appear in public without shame.
26. Smith associates such sensibility with the development of ‘civilized society’ in which people feel 
secure enough to relax with each other and be patient and considerate of each other’s emotions and weak-
nesses, in contrast to the wound up emotional intensity and barely restrained violence that he associates with 
the insecurity of ‘barbarian’ societies (TMS V.2.10). Compare also with Solomon’s criticism of thinking of 
business life as “like the brutal and heroic world of Homer’s Iliad ” (Solomon 1992a, 332).
27. Industriousness also directly interacts with temperance, insofar as one’s time, attention, and energy, 
are also resources that one ‘consumes’ in ways influenced by one’s perception of and management of one’s 
relationship to social standards, so the same mechanisms analysed under temperance can also apply. By their 
nature, the virtues continually interplay with each other so that effects on one may undermine, support, or 
346 Business Ethics Quarterly
transform others, and this is certainly relevant to the full consideration of the effects on competition on the 
bourgeois virtues. However, lack of space precludes further development of this issue here.
28. If people are under great pressure to be too industriousness, they may ‘burn out.’ As Smith noted 
in arguing that higher and fairer wages generally motivated people to work harder rather than increasing 
laziness, “Workmen, on the contrary, when they are liberally paid by the piece, are very apt to over-work 
themselves, and to ruin their health and constitution in a few years” (WN I.viii.44). There is a wealth of 
empirical research on how work intensity and duration negatively affects workers’ stress, long-term health, 
and life and relationships outside work. For example, Major, Klein, and Ehrhart (2002) find ‘work overload’ 
(job intensity) and organizational expectations for time spent at work directly related to reported work–fam-
ily conflicts and also psychological distress, with implications for long-tem mental health and hence future 
industriousness. White et al. (2003) find that ‘high performance work practices,’ employed by firms to raise 
commitment and productivity through, for example, performance related pay and appraisal systems, are 
associated with increased work-family life conflicts.
29. This passage has been the subject of much scholarly attention (see, e.g., Fleischacker 2005, 105–11; 
Hanley 2009, 104–9). Significantly it incorporates phrases directly taken from Rousseau’s Discourse on 
Inequality, and seems to be saying that yes, Rousseau is right, even if materially wealthy a commercial 
society in which only a primitive basic prudence was possible would be, as Rousseau argued, composed of 
people motivated by amour-propre to pursue endless and insatiable desires, perpetually restless and unhappy.
30. Recall that justice for Smith is limited to the ‘negative virtue’ of not breaching one’s perfectly 
specifiable, and thus rather limited, obligations not to harm others. Honesty can be considered the positive 
side of fairness in that it requires respect for others, and honoring one’s particular relationships with them, 
in ways that go beyond what can be legally prescribed.
31. As Marx put it “Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social 
conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. . . . 
All that is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned” (Marx and Engels 2002: 223).
32. Such promotion is often linked to laissez-faire economic ideology and a business friendly agenda 
(less taxes and government regulation), as, for example, with the Fraser Institute’s annually published index 
of ‘Economic Freedom.’
33. Similarly, Adam Smith, after extolling the benefits of free markets at great length, spent book V of 
the WN laying out in great detail partial institutional correctives for its deleterious consequences.
34. There is some overlap here with the analysis and recommendations of so-called ‘Libertarian pater-
nalists’ (see, among many recent contributions, the overview provided in Thaler, Sunstein, and Balz 2010).
REFERENCES
Alpizar, F., F. Carlsson, and O. Johansson-Stenman. 2005. “How Much Do We Care About 
Absolute Versus Relative Income Consumption?,” Journal of Economic Behaviour 
& Organisation 56: 405–21.
Badhwar, N. K. 2008. “Friendship and Commercial Societies,” Politics Philosophy 
Economics 7(3) (August 1): 301–26. DOI:10.1177/1470594X08092105.
Bassiry, G. R., and M. Jones. 1993. “Adam Smith and the Ethics of Contemporary 
Capitalism,” Journal of Business Ethics 12(8): 621–27.
Berggren, N., and H. Jordahl. 2006. “Free to Trust: Economic Freedom and Social Capital,” 
Kyklos 59(2): 141–69.
Blaug, M. 1996. Economic Theory in Retrospect. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Boot, A. 2009. De ontwortelde samenleving. Ondernemingen overgeleverd aan financiers? 
Assen: Van Gorcum.
Bovenberg, A. L. 2002. “Norms, Values, and Technological Change,” De Economist 
150(5): 521–53.
347Adam Smith’s Bourgeois Virtues in Competition
. 2007. “Boekbespreking,” Christen Democratische Verkenningen 28(3): 166–
70.
Calkins, M. J., and P. H. Werhane. 1998. “Adam Smith, Aristotle, and the Virtues of 
Commerce,” The Journal of Value Inquiry 32(1): 43–60.
Carlsson, F., O. Johansson-Stenman, and P. Martinsson. 2007. “Do You Enjoy Having More 
than Others? Survey Evidence of Positional Goods,” Economica 74, no. 296(11): 
586–98.
Carmon, Z., K. Wertenbroch, and M. Zeelenberg. 2003. “Option Attachment: When 
Deliberating Makes Choosing Feel Like Losing,” Journal of Consumer Research 
30: 15–29.
Dhar, R. 1997. “Consumer Preference for a No Choice Option,” Journal of Consumer 
Research 24(2): 215–31.
Fleischacker, S. 2005. On Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations: A Philosophical Companion. 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Florida, R. L. 2002. The Rise of the Creative Class. New York: Basic Books.
Franklin, B. 2008 (1748). The Way to Wealth and Poor Richard’s Almanac. Nayika 
Publishing.
Frey, B. S., C. Benesch, and A. Stutzer. 2007. “Does Watching TV Make Us Happy?,” 
Journal of Economic Psychology 28(3): 283–313.
Graafland, J. J., and H. Smid. 2004. “Reputation, Corporate Social Responsibility and 
Market Regulation,” Tijdschrift voor Economie en Management 49(2): 269–306.
Graham, J. R., C. R. Harvey, and S. Rajgopal. 2005. “The Economic Implications Of 
Corporate Financial Reporting,” Journal of Accounting and Economics 40(1): 
3–73. DOI:10.1016/j.jacceco.2005.01.002.
Griswold, C. L. 1999. Adam Smith and the Virtues of Enlightenment. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Hanley, R. 2006. “Adam Smith, Aristotle and Virtue Ethics,” in New Voices on Adam Smith, 
ed. Leonidas Montes and Eric Schliesser. London. New York: Routledge, 17–39.
. 2008. “Commerce and Corruption: Rousseau’s Diagnosis and Adam Smith’s 
Cure,” European Journal of Political Theory 7(2): 137–58.
. 2009. Adam Smith and the Character of Virtue. New York: Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Heath, J. 2006. “The Benefits of Cooperation,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 34: 313–51. 
DOI:10.1111/j.1088-4963.2006.00073.x.
. 2007. “An Adversarial Ethic for Business: Or When Sun-Tzu Met the 
Stakeholder,” Journal of Business Ethics 72(4): 359–74.
Henrich, J., J. Ensminger, R. McElreath, A. Barr, C. Barrett, A. Bolyanatz, J. C. Cardenas, 
M. Gurven, E. Gwako, N. Henrich, C. Lesorogol, F. Marlowe, D. Tracer, and J. 
Ziker. 2010. “Markets, Religion, Community Size, and the Evolution of Fairness 
And Punishment,” Science 327 (March): 1480–84. DOI:10.1126/science.1182238.
Hirsch, F. 1977. Social Limits to Growth. London: Routledge.
Hirschman, A. O. 1982. “Rival Interpretations of Market Society: Civilizing, Destructive, 
or Feeble?,” Journal of Economic Literature 20(4): 1463–84.
348 Business Ethics Quarterly
. 1997 (1977). The Passions and the Interests. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press.
Hursthouse, R. 2007. “Virtue Ethics,” in the Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, http://
plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-virtue/.
Iyengar, S. S., and M. R. Lepper. 2000. “When Choice Is Demotivating: Can One Desire 
Too Much of a Good Thing?,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 79: 
995–1006.
Johansson-Stenman, O., F. Carlsson, and D. Daruvala. 2002. “Measuring Future 
Grandparents’ Preferences for Equality and Relative Standing,” Economic Journal 
112: 362–83.
Kahneman, D., P. Slovic, and A. Tversky. 1982. Judgment under Uncertainty. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Knack, S., and P. Keefer. 1997. “Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-
Country Investigation,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 112: 1251–88.
Knight, F. H. 1923. “The Ethics of Competition,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 
37(4): 579–624.
Kreps, D. M. 1997. “The Interaction between Norms and Economic Incentives: Intrinsic 
Motivation and Extrinsic Incentives,” American Economic Review 87: 359–64.
Laverty, K. J. 1996 “Economic ‘Short-termism’: The Debate, the Unresolved Issues, and 
the Implications for Management Practice and Research,” Academy of Management 
Review 21: 825–60.
Layard, R. 2003. “Happiness: Has Social Science a Clue?,” Lionel Robbins Memorial 
Lectures 2002/2003, Centre for Economic Performance, London School of 
Economics and Political Science.
Lazear, E. P. 2000. “The Power of Incentives,” American Economic Review 90(2): 410–14.
Lienhard, M. 2006. “Productivity and Well-Being under Fixed Wages and Piece Rates,” in 
Psychological Foundation of Wage Incentives: An Experimental Analysis (Doctoral 
Thesis, University of Zurich, 2006), pp 65–104. http://www.iew.uzh.ch/study/
thesisses/mlienhard/dissertation.pdf.
Mac Intyre, A. C. 1981. After Virtue. London: Duckworth.
. 1995. Marxism and Christianity. London: Duckworth.
MacKenzie, D. A. 2006. An Engine, Not a Camera: How Financial Models Shape Markets. 
Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Maitland, I. 1997 “Virtuous Markets. The Market as School of Virtues,” Business Ethics 
Quarterly 7: 17–33.
Major, V. S., K. J. Klein, and M. G. Ehrhart. 2002. “Work Time, Work Interference with 
Family, and Psychological Distress,” Journal of Applied Psychology 87: 427–36.
Marx, K., and F. Engels. 2002 (1848). The Communist Manifesto, ed. Gareth Stedman 
Jones. Penguin Classics.
McCloskey, D. 2006. The Bourgeois Virtues. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
. 2008. “Adam Smith, the Last of the Former Virtue Ethicists,” History of 
Political Economy 40(1): 43–71.
349Adam Smith’s Bourgeois Virtues in Competition
McCloskey, D. N. 1998. “Bourgeois Virtue and the History of P and S,” The Journal of 
Economic History 58(2): 297–317.
Mick, D. G., S. M. Broniarczyk, and J. Haidt. 2004. “Choose, Choose, Choose, Choose, 
Choose, Choose: Emerging and Prospective Research on the Deleterious Effects of 
Living in Consumer Hyper Choice,” Journal of Business Ethics 52: 207–11.
Miller, J. G. 1984. “Culture and the Development of Everyday Social Explanation,” 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 46(5): 961–78. DOI:10.1037/0022-
3514.46.5.961.
Otteson, J. 2002. Adam Smith’s Marketplace of Life. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
Pitts, J. 2005. A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and France. 
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Raphael, D. D., and A. L. Macfie. 1982. “Introduction,” in Adam Smith, The Theory Of 
Moral Sentiments. Indianapolis: Liberty Classics.
Rappaport, A. 2005. “The Economics of Short-Term Performance Obsession,” Financial 
Analyst Journal 61: 65–79.
Rasmussen, D. C. 2008. The Problems and Promise of Commercial Society. University 
Park: Pennsylvania State University Press.
Ross, L. 1977. “The Intuitive Psychologist and His Shortcomings: Distortions in the 
Attribution Process,” Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 10: 173–220. 
New York: Academic Press.
Schor, J. B. 1993. The Overworked American: The Unexpected Decline of Leisure. New 
York: Basic Books.
. 1997. Beyond an Economy of Work and Spend. Tilburg: Tilburg University 
Press.
Schwartz, B. 2004. The Paradox of Choice. New York: HarperCollins Publishers Inc.
Sennett, R. 1998. The Corrosion of Character. New York: Norton.
. 2007. The Culture of the New Capitalism. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University 
Press.
Shafir, E., I. Simonson, and A. Tversky. 1992. “Reason-Based Choice,” Cognition 49(1): 
11–36.
Shafir, E., and A. Tversky. 1992. “Thinking through Uncertainty: Nonconsequential 
Reasoning and Choice,” Cognitive Psychology 24(4): 449–74.
Shearer, B. 2004. “Piece Rates, Fixed Wages and Incentives: Evidence from a Field 
Experiment,” Review of Economic Studies 71(2): 513–34. DOI:10.1111/0034-
6527.00294.
Shepard, J. M., J. Shepard, and R. E. Wokutch. 1991. “The Problem of Business Ethics: 
Oxymoron or Inadequate Vocabulary?,” Journal of Business and Psychology 6(1): 
9–23.
Skreta, V., and L. Veldkamp. 2009. “Ratings Shopping and Asset Complexity: A Theory of 
Ratings Inflation,” NBER working paper no. 14761.
350 Business Ethics Quarterly
Smith, A. 1981 [1776, 1789]. An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of 
Nations, ed. R. H. Campbell, A. S. Skinner, and W. B. Todd. Indianapolis: Liberty 
Classics.
. 1982a [1762–1763, 1766]. Lectures on Jurisprudence, ed. R. L. Meek, D. D. 
Raphael, and P. G. Stein. Indianapolis: Liberty Press.
. 1982b [1759, 1790]. The Theory of Moral Sentiments, ed. D. D. Raphael and 
A. L. Macfie. Indianapolis: Liberty Classics.
Solnick, S. J., and D. Hemenway. 1998. “Is More Always Better? A Survey on Positional 
Concerns,” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 37: 373–83.
Solomon, R. C. 1992a. “Corporate Roles, Personal Virtues: An Aristotelean Approach to 
Business Ethics,” Business Ethics Quarterly 2(3): 317–39.
. 1992b. Ethics and Excellence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
. 1998. “The Moral Psychology of Business: Care and Compassion in the 
Corporation,” Business Ethics Quarterly 8(3): 515–33.
. 2002. “Business Ethics and Virtue,” in A Companion to Business Ethics, ed. 
Robert Frederick. Wiley-Blackwell, 30–55.
. 2008. “Free Enterprise, Sympathy, and Virtue,” in Moral Markets, ed. Paul J. 
Zak. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 16–41.
van Staveren, I. 2009. “Virtue Ethics,” in Handbook of Economics and Ethics, ed. Jan Peil 
and Irene van Staveren. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 570–77.
Stigler, G. J. 1987. “Competition,” in The New Palgrave, ed. J. Eatwell, M. Milgate, and P. 
Newman. London: Macmillan.
Thaler, R. H., C. R. Sunstein, and J. P. Balz. 2010. “Choice Architecture,” SSRN eLibrary 
(April 2). http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1583509.
Vickers, J. S. 1995. “Concepts of Competition,” Oxford Economic Papers 47: 1–23.
Weber, M. 2003 [1904–1905]. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans. 
Talcott Parsons. Courier Dover Publications.
Wells, T. Forthcoming. “Adam Smith on Morality and Self-Interest,” in Handbook of the 
Philosophical Foundations of Business Ethics, ed. Christoph Lütge. Springer.
Werhane, P. 1989. “The Role of Self-Interest in Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations,” Journal 
of Philosophy 86(11): 669–80.
. 1991. Adam Smith and His Legacy for Modern Capitalism. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
. 1999. Moral Imagination and Management Decision-Making. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
. 2000. “Business Ethics and the Origins of Contemporary Capitalism: 
Economics and Ethics in the Work of Adam Smith and Herbert Spencer,” Journal of 
Business Ethics 24(3): 185–98.
White, M., S. Hill, P. McGovern, C. Mills, and D. Smeaton. 2003. “ ‘High-Performance’ 
Management Practices, Working Hours and Work-Life Balance,” British Journal of 
Industrial Relations 41, no. 2 (6): 175–95. DOI:10.1111/1467-8543.00268.
Zak, P. J., and S. Knack. 2001. “Trust and Growth,” The Economic Journal 111(470) 
(April): 295–321.
